Without recognizing that the most important source of protest is the search for
justice, we cannot comprehend the developments.
To equate the diaspora with the MHP because of protests
that fundamentally “seek justice” is truly disrespectful and insolent.
Taner Akcam

This interview with Prof. Taner Akcam was conducted at Clark University’s Strassler Center in Massachusetts on Oct. 30 by Dr. Vera Eccarius-Kelly for the blog project “Changing Turkey in a Changing World,” affiliated with the Centre for Global and Transnational Politics at Royal Holloway, University of London (changingturkey.wordpress.com).

The blog’s editors, however, declined to publish the interview in its entirety, opting instead to publish only three selected questions and answers out of a total of eight originally submitted questions. No questions and answers pertaining to Armenian-Turkish relations were included in the blog posting. Professor Eccarius-Kelly considered this a missed opportunity to represent important insights into Armenian-Turkish relations and to support democratization and freedom of speech in Turkey. She approached the Armenian Weekly with the full text of the interview which appears in print below for the first time.

Vera Eccarius-Kelly is associate professor of political science at Siena College, Albany, N.Y. She can be reached at veccarius-kelly@siena.edu.

***

The Turkish-Armenian Protocols

VEK: In your assessment, has anything tangibly or concretely changed since this new arrangement was initiated between Armenia and Turkey?

TA: Right now neither side has taken any concrete steps but this isn’t terribly important. The process has just started. What worries me is that if the situation regarding Karabagh doesn’t improve, there may not be any steps. A strange set of circumstances exist there and Turkey created it. If you read the protocols, you’ll see that they state that diplomatic relations will begin without any preconditions. Without a doubt, one could also read this as setting a condition that Armenia’s acceptance of the borders between the two countries will be predicated upon its approval of the creation of various commissions, including a historian’s commission.

However, there are no articles in the protocols that connect the issues with Karabaghğ to establishing diplomatic relations and opening up the borders. Nevertheless, Turkey has announced countless times that it would not open the borders until the issue with Karabagh is resolved. In other words, Turkey has signed a protocol that it openly declares it is not going to follow. If both sides cannot make progress on Karabagh, I’m not sure how Turkey is going to get itself out of the corner that it has backed itself into. If Turkey doesn’t figure out a way to stop being Azerbaijan’s slave on this issue, it will have set the stage for an absurd embarrassment. How does a government let itself get caught in such a political lien held by another government? I just can’t understand it.

VEK: Would you classify this development as a substantial step toward the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia?

TA: If we presume that Turkey is going to respect the terms of the protocols and if we expect the borders to be opened, then we can consider Oct. 10, 2009 as a turning point in history. Starting from this date forward, Turkish-Armenian relations entered a new period. I would like to call this stage the “counting down period.” I don’t know when and where this backward counting will end, but with the signing of the protocols it is most definitely a period to be characterized as counting down until Turkey ultimately accepts certain issues about the subject of 1915. Just as Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika brought about the end of the USSR, these protocols will bring about the end of politics of denial regarding what happened in 1915, policies that have been followed by the modern Turkish republic.

It may seem surprising for me to be saying this at a time when nothing has been done yet, and when Armenian circles in particular feel such a deep sense of suspicion and anxiety. But for this very reason I would like to repeat that the era of Yusuf Halacoglu, Gunduz Aktan, and Sukru Elekdag is over, it’s done. Ninety years of denial politics are about to end. The moment the protocols were signed these policies became bankrupt. It’s that simple. If Turkey intends to follow the same path it’s been following, none of this has any meaning and you can throw the protocols in the trash.

The real issue from this point on is what and how much Turkey will accept. We have before us a broad spectrum of choices that I call the Japanese-German pendulum. The Japanese example is best described as a kind of half-hearted “sorry, no hard feelings” statement. Using the same behavior that the Japanese have shown regarding their responsibility for crimes committed during World War II, Turkey could accept that “crimes” happened and affected Armenian citizens during 1915, and then apologize. However, such an apology will neither move forward the internal democratization process in Turkey nor do anything to heal the wounds of the past. I can tell you now that such an action would be practically meaningless from the point of view of the Armenians.

In the alternative, Turkey could pursue the example that Germany has followed regarding the latter’s role in acknowledging Nazi crimes. That would mean accepting what occurred in 1915 as genocide. It would make an honest acknowledgment of history an important source of the internal democratization process and it would open the door to the payment of social, cultural, and financial restitution to heal the wounds of those who suffered in the past. In fact, knowing that these other countries played a role in what transpired in 1915, it would invite the major countries of Europe and Russia to participate in the process. It is very difficult to surmise where in this process, between these two opposite poles, we will end up. Confronting one’s history has become the main issue in politics and international diplomacy.

VEK: What do these protocols mean for Armenians?

TA: From the vantage point of Armenia, the opening of the borders will bring about economic, social, and political gains. Armenia will be able to free itself from the sense of being walled in and it will bring the country closer to the West. This could have the effect of minimizing Russia’s influence on Armenia also. Besides all that, the development of relations between the two peoples will open up doors to resolving the problems that grew out of our histories. Hrant Dink believed in this also.

It is true, as far as the issues related to history are concerned, that there is a deep sense of anticipation and insecurity among Armenian circles. Armenians will want to observe how serious and trustworthy Turkey is going to be. Unfortunately, Turkey hasn’t been able to impart a sense of trust during the signing of the protocols and continues to send out signals that give the impression that it will continue its past behavior. I would say that trust is the biggest problem right now.

The main source of this insecurity is not just related to Turkey’s behavior in the past. Turkey continues to maintain an attitude and engages in actions that directly conflict with the protocols and this exacerbates the sense of insecurity that has prevailed for so long. The fact that Turkey has made Karabagh a precondition (even though it was not a part of the protocols) and that it won’t present the protocols to parliament is just one example of how the problems are being perpetuated.

I can describe other contradictions that relate to the relationship between the protocols and Turkey’s attitude. When Turkey proposes the establishment of a historian’s commission, it is using an argument that is rather persuasive and actually quite credible. The country has used this presumption quite effectively to convince third parties. Turkey stated that it supports “forming a commission to allow an examination of historical records and to make recommendations that we’ll abide by.” In other words, Turkey announced that its position and its decisions will be a function of the recommendations of this commission. Turkey is promoting the idea that “whatever this newly created commission says, will be accepted” and “we’ll go along with it.” On first glance it appears completely reasonable, and yet that’s where the problem lies: Looking at the past 90 years and the policies followed today in Turkey, the government is acting in a way that contradicts the rational arguments that it ostensibly has been promoting.

Some of Turkey’s state officials continue to give speeches filled with 90 years of lies. Turkey still has organizations and institutions actively working to counter the “baseless Armenian Genocide claims.” We have a government in Turkey that declares to “let a commission decide,” while it maintains state internet sites that use words like the “so-called Armenian genocide claims.” Here’s a government that says, “Let historians, not politicians decide,” and yet one of the highest offices of the government is an organization that is called the Coordinating Committee to Combat Baseless Genocide Claims. This office is directly connected to the National Security Council. Let’s face it, this does not present a very convincing picture. Until something is done to remove these contradictions, it will be hard for Turkey to be considered trustworthy.

In my opinion before bothering to form a commission, some very serious steps need to be taken by the Turkish government to show that it does not want to repeat the actions of the past. The Coordinating Committee that is connected to the National Security Council needs to be disbanded. Prosecution of people under Article 301 [of the Turkish penal code] for having used the word “genocide” needs to be dismissed. There are dozens of steps that must be taken—like having the content about “baseless Armenian genocide claims” removed from all the ministries’ internet sites, including the General Staff’s site. Turkey could start there.
 
VEK: Turkey appears to be focused on raising its political and economic profile in the region and beyond. Is the Turkish government also signaling Europe that it is committed to reform and democratization?

TA: I don’t think that the attitude of Europe is central to the decision-making of the Turkish government. The European Union is not a driving force at the moment. My understanding is that Turkey’s relations with the European Union have come to a standstill. We are experiencing a process in which Turkish democratization has taken place without Europe, and even despite Europe. Two major pillars of the European Union, Germany and France, continuously repeat that Turkey doesn’t belong to Europe regardless of Turkey’s actions. Personally, as a liberal intellectual, I am fed up with the spoiled attitude represented by the German and French governments. How dare they exclude Turkey from the democratization process of the European Union by developing a double standard for Turkey? I think these two governments have been dishonest, which is quite discouraging. I don’t think Turkey started this process with Armenia to send signals to the European Union. That is, at best, a byproduct of the Turkish-Armenian protocols.

The main issue in Turkey is that the country is undergoing a transitional period. My Armenian friends in the diaspora can’t seem to fully understand this development. Turkey is experiencing the same problems that other states experienced when they transitioned from an authoritarian system to a more open and democratic society. Such a society faces major problems related to the boundaries and the limits of its justice system. That is why this particular period can be described as being representative of a transitional justice system. How a country deals with its own historical past and how it determines the boundaries of justice shapes its future path.

It is a fact that Turkey is changing. Since 2002, Turkey has undergone a remarkable development in terms of its ability to embrace change, which should be called revolutionary. For the very first time in Turkish republican history, we see the surfacing of a new type of elite whose origins came from outside the established political class. This new elite developed from beyond the perimeter of the state bureaucracy and from outside the bourgeois class. This is a very important point because this newly emerged class does not owe its development to the state. Its leaders don’t feel dependent on existing political and bureaucratic structures and powers. Therefore, they can’t be manipulated as easily by the old elites that consist of elements in the bureaucracy and the military. In Turkey, some scholars call this new class the “Anatolian tigers,” because this particular middle class developed its own sources of power and penetrated the established ruling elites. This development created immediate conflict with the
long-established power structures in Turkey. Now we need to observe the extent to which this new elite may be willing to compromise, and how far they are willing to go to exclude the old ruling class from power.

The new middle class has an Islamic-oriented leadership and it knows that it can only win this conflict with the military and the bureaucracy by insisting on pursuing a process of democratization. Otherwise the Turkish military will never allow the new elite to be part of the ruling class in Turkey. I am sure that if the United States and the European Union continue to clearly support the democratization process, democracy will gain the upper hand. Should that international support not be forthcoming, we will experience another military coup d’état. We have had at least four or five different coups d’état or military interventions, and foreign powers have always been playing an important role in this part of Turkish history. I can assure you that these military interventions in our history could happen because the European Union, Germany, France, and other countries, and the Unites States openly supported such military missions.

VEK: How would you characterize the influence of Turkish civil society on democratization today compared to a decade ago? What are the internal and external dynamics that drive democratization?

TA: During the last decade, a new actor emerged in the political arena that we hadn’t seen before in Turkey. Alongside the AKP government, civil society became a very important political factor. It was unheard of in Turkey that a prime minister would go to Diyarbakir, for example, give a speech to the Kurdish people, and offer some apologies. It would have been unimaginable before this speech for a prime minister to invite civil society institutions to discuss ideas related to the speech. Turkish civil society organizations know that they have an open ear in this government and that new perspectives will be heard. This doesn’t mean that the government agrees with the suggestions of civil society or implements their demands, but an open dialogue exists and it is healthy for democracy.

Democratization does indeed have both internal and external dynamics, and what we have before us is a historical juncture in time. We are experiencing a rare moment where both internal and external dynamics are merging in one place at one time. This happens only rarely in our history and I harbor a great deal of hope that the historical opportunity afforded by the meeting of these internal and external dynamics will be used wisely by the parties involved.

On the subject of internal dynamics, there are a few ideas I would like to add to what I have already said. The way the armed forces have started to get pushed out of the field of civilian politics is the best example of this internal dynamic. I believe the AKP saw clearly, as it did in Semdinli, that the search for a compromise with the military would bring about its own end. It therefore pressed the reform button again. This attitude was in line with the expectations of Turkish society, which has been experiencing a huge transition. The shell and the walls that have been constructed around the state and its society have started to break apart with economic and commercial changes, with new communication technologies, and with tourism and other ways of connecting to the outside world. Turkish modernization has reached a point today that makes the current state a dysfunctional one—woven out of out “taboos” and “lies.”

I would also like to add that “fatigue” and “exhaustion” are factors that led to this transition dynamic. Turkish society is tired after 30 or 40 years of war, where the same slogans have been used to motivate people to go to the field and fight each other. Maybe Turks were once willing and enthusiastic to fight and pursue “terrorists and separatists,” and to kill or die for the fatherland. And maybe that used to be the same for the young Kurdish men in their villages, because instead of experiencing all this injustice it seemed better to take to the hills and fight against the Turkish government. But they are also tired now. Old slogans that once encouraged the fighting and the killing don’t motivate people any more. Ninety years of “taboos and lies” no longer motivate.

As for external dynamics, I could summarize it as the Obama factor, the American withdrawal from Iraq, and the wish to leave a stable government behind and developments in the energy sector. The U.S. will not be able to leave Iraq without resolving the PKK problem and establishing peace and stability between the Kurdish administration and Turkey. I should also add that the U.S. knows that one source of the problem it identifies as “Islamic terrorism” is the tension between Israel and Palestine. In the past it sought to resolve this tension by standing directly next to Israel in the peace process. The invasion of Iraq was one part of this strategy, but the U.S. seems to have realized that this strategy is not going to solve the problem and in fact carries the potential for making “Islamic terrorism” a permanent fixture. It appears that there is now a new focus on strengthening the relationship between Islam and democracy, and for building a foundation under Turkish leadership as part of an effort to redesign the region.

To this picture we can add that Russia is searching for alternatives in the way to transfer energy to the West by circumventing Ukraine and Georgia. These external factors match up with Turkey’s policy of having “zero problems with neighbors.” It would appear that the Middle East is going to be re-organized and under these circumstances a new strategic approach, a kind of Pan-Ottomanica, is going to gain in importance.

In the years ahead of us, I predict that Turkey could possibly move away from a European perspective, one that has been squeezed into a German-French axis by a Europe that is still arrogant while nevertheless exhibiting fatigue, and for this reason, a lack of vision as well. A new project, one that I could define as the creation of the “common house for the peoples of the Middle East,” appears to be poised to begin with the support of external powers. I also predict that liberal and intellectual circles, which had defended and supported Turkey’s EU adventure, will not look too coldly on this new perspective. Besides, if this “common house for the Middle East” is able to develop along a democratic axis, no one is going to have much to object to.

VEK: How do you interpret the fact that Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk faces renewed court cases for having addressed Ottoman responsibility in Armenian and Kurdish mass killings?

TA: There are two important aspects to this problem; one relates to the shadowy, illegal organization called Ergenekon and the second part relates to the general Turkish justice system.

Ergenekon has been orchestrating attacks against intellectuals. All court cases against Orhan Pamuk, Hrant Dink, and Elif Shafak have been initiated by members of Ergenekon. In my own case, there has been a campaign organized against me in the U.S. and also partially in Turkey. I’ve been accused of being a terrorist and of killing Americans in Turkey. I now know that this campaign here in the U.S. has been organized and launched from Istanbul by a man named Kemal Kerincsiz, a lawyer. He is a defendant in the Ergenekon case and he is in prison. I know this because the Ergenekon indictment revealed that it was Kemal Kerincsiz who managed all these insidious activities against intellectuals, including smear campaigns and hate speech. This secret organization, Ergenekon, used anti-Armenianism as a political platform like the Nazis played into anti-Semitism in Germany. Its architects knew that they could gain a certain level of support following the exact same logic and techniques as the Nazis. Ergenekon members knew that if they played into anti-Armenian sentiments in Turkey and mobilized people against the genocide claims, they could gain a political advantage. This is how members of this shadowy group organized the Talat Pasha demonstrations in Berlin and other demonstrations in Basel, Zurich, and Paris. They rallied the Turkish Diaspora against Armenians and mobilized their own constituencies within Turkey against Turkish intellectuals they wanted to target. The assassination of Hrant Dink and of other Christians is a parallel political program carried out by Ergenekon.

The second aspect that I mentioned earlier directly relates to the justice system, which is still basically controlled by the military. I’m fully aware of the fact that the Turkish justice system is made up of Turkish judges and public prosecutors who are mostly opposed to the current Turkish government. They also despise the democratization process in Turkey and try everything to stop its progress. In some ways, the justice system as one of the representatives of the old guard is succeeding in slowing down the democratization efforts. One example relates to Article 301. Within the administration there has been a fight, and unfortunately the governing party is not radical enough. The AKP is still trying to compromise with the justice system and with the old type of thinking by keeping rather than rescinding Article 301. This allows some court cases against intellectuals to go forward.

The last decision of the appellate court regarding the Orhan Pamuk case is particularly instructive. According to the court’s decision, every individual Turk who lives in Turkey can now file a complaint against Orhan Pamuk for insulting Turkishness. If an individual person feels insulted by what Orhan Pamuk states or writes about, that individual can file a court case and Pamuk must pay a penalty. There are individuals who are pursuing this option at the moment. As a consequence, my publisher stopped producing books related to the Armenian Genocide and 1915. The publication of a new book of mine has been postponed indefinitely. My publisher stated that we have to first observe what is going on so that we won’t face hundreds of court cases for using the term “genocide” when we publish books directly related to the genocide. So you can see quite clearly that the justice system is still a huge problem and that even very liberal publishing houses want to postpone certain publications as a consequence of these developments.

VEK: Will changes in the Turkish-Armenian relationship have an impact on archival research? Will Ottoman historians feel less inclined to self-censor their work in relation to disputed periods in history?

TA: I am not sure that the protocols can be considered a turning point in this regard. I believe that Hrant Dink’s assassination is much more important than the protocols for Turkish domestic policies. Once AKP came to power, access to all archives became much easier because new directors facilitated access for scholars to work in the archives. In 2006, I worked in the archive for a month and the staff was very helpful to me. Today, everyone can enter and pursue work there. But after Hrant Dink’s assassination we learned that there is another Turkey. If you work on the genocide in Turkey, there is little that can be done against you through legal means, but you could be killed. For example, archival work and travel in Turkey became a nightmare for me after the Hrant Dink assassination. To walk toward the archives or come out of the archives meant that you were seen in a public space and you never knew what was going to happen to you. There still are Turkish intellectuals under police protection right now, which shows how fragile the situation in Turkey really is.

Being aware of the fragility of the situation—and knowing about the existence of these extreme right-wing people who are organized within the military and bureaucracy—is frightening. The Turkish government tries to protect intellectuals like Baskin Oran, Etyen Mahcupyan, and Murat Belge. A number of intellectuals are walking around with police detail. It does seem a little awkward but it is true that the government protects its own citizens against groups and organizations that are basically organized within the very same structures.

VEK: Will any of these developments impact current discussions related to the Kurdish Opening in Turkey?

TA: Definitely. We can only understand the Turkish-Armenian protocols if we consider the big picture. The Kurdish issue certainly is another part of this big picture. The Kurdish Opening is a direct product of the transition we are experiencing in Turkey. In terms of the Armenian issue, the Turkish government should follow the exact same steps that it has pursued regarding the Kurdish issue. If we examine how the Turkish government has been trying to solve the Kurdish issue, we will find ways to solve the Armenian issue. For example, what does it mean when we discuss the concept of acknowledging the truth? Until 2000 or 2002, or even as late as 2007, the Turkish government denied that the Kurdish people even existed. I was put in prison in 1975 because I wrote about the Kurds in Turkey. So acknowledgment of the truth is a central aspect in solving the Kurdish Question. With the reforms introduced after 2002, the Turkish government has acknowledged that there are Kurds living in Turkey. It should be the same for Armenians; something terrible happened and a crime occurred in 1915. By acknowledging the existence of the crime you can solve 1915.

Secondly, in the process of solving the Kurdish Question, the government has tried to establish justice. If you want to solve a problem related to injustices in the past you have to rectify it. There must be a way of compensation for this injustice. There are two possibilities, two ways of establishing justice: One is retributive justice, which is exactly what is going on in the Kurdish areas right now. Some officers have been charged with killing Kurdish civilians in the past, and those officers have been detained or lost their positions. In addition, mass graves have been opened up. This is important for the establishment of justice. In the case of the Armenians, this approach is useless because the killings happened 100 years ago. But there is another way of approaching justice; justice can be achieved through the principles of restorative justice. Restorative justice can also play a role in the Kurdish issue. Many perpetrators are fearful that the crimes they have committed will be disclosed. You can follow the South African model and give amnesty to those who reveal their crimes, for instance.

I see a very strong correlation not only regarding the solution but also regarding the origins of the Kurdish and Armenian issues. If I may put it bluntly, the Armenian issue was the Kurdish issue of the 19th century. Or the Kurdish conflict today is the Armenian conflict of the 19th century because in both cases the same mentality produced similar outcomes. In both centuries, the Turkish and the Ottoman governments considered the democratic demands of minority groups as a security threat. In the late 19th century and early 20th century, Armenian demands for social reform and equality were framed as a trap for the Ottoman state’s pursuit of security and territorial integrity. In the 1970’s, 1980’s, and  1990’s, and even until very recently, the Turkish state considered the Kurdish demands for cultural rights and equality as a challenge to its national security and territorial integrity. In both cases, the demands of the minority groups were suppressed. This caused the radicalization of both minority groups, and this very radicalization is ironically creating the security problems the governments were most scared of. The separatist movements and the challenges to territorial integrity became a problem as a direct consequence of governmental policies to repress these minorities. The parallels between the two cases are important to consider.

The Diaspora, Turkey, and Turkish Intellectuals

VEK: The Turkish media has depicted the Armenian Diaspora in a rather negative light. How should the Turkish media’s attitude and the diaspora’s response be evaluated?

AT: The attitude of the Turkish media on this issue is unfortunately extremely upsetting. Publishing articles that place the diaspora on the same level as the MHP [National People’s Party, a nationalist party in Turkey] is very disrespectful to the Armenians of the diaspora, and everyone should understand how shameful that is. Look, the media’s attitude of perceiving the diaspora with hostility and as the “other” isn’t just limited to the media; this attitude is prevalent even among circles considered progressive, leftist, and liberal. This attitude has very deep roots and one could say that it consists of demeaning everything Armenian. I would describe the treatment of Armenians as an odd combination of arrogance and disrespect. Add on top of this a huge well of ignorance. Maybe this is the arrogance of someone who, feeling pretty powerful, believes he’s won a great victory already against another who is weak, defenseless, and aware of their defeated state. I know the words I’m using seem harsh. I don’t want to generalize against all intellectuals and the media, but we need to admit that there this is a very deep seated attitude.

Let me give you an example. The Armenian Weekly is a newspaper that is published in Boston but updated on a daily basis on its website. This newspaper is an official publication of the Dashnaks, who have been completely vilified by the Turkish media and intellectuals, including by TARAF. This newspaper along with other English-language Armenian newspapers , such as the Armenian Reporter and the Armenian Mirror-Spectator, systematically cover the protocols and publish articles both pro and con. Some of our intellectuals, like Ayse Guϋnaysu and Eren Keskin, regularly write for the Armenian Weekly. How many of our intellectuals, of our journalists, would you say, take a look at these newspapers and follow the debate that is going on and produce analysis based on it?

There is this pervasive attitude; it’s like our guys know the Armenian Diaspora better than the Armenians themselves. We have no problem coming to conclusions and expressing opinions without having any idea whatsoever about what is actually happening over there, about what is being discussed and debated. There is an attitude of bizarre arrogance and I’m not sure how to explain what I see other than “excessively spoiled behavior” among our media and intellectuals.

VEK: Is there a difference between the Armenian Diaspora and Armenia? Does the diaspora act in a way that could be perceived as monolithic?

TA: I’m going to repeat a position that I have defended in the past. It is simply incorrect to depict the Armenian state and the Armenian Diaspora as two separate entities with opposing points of views. It is wrong to draw a line regarding differing opinions about the subject of 1915 that separates the diaspora from Armenia. A political stance that tries to gain some advantage from drawing this distinction is not going to be very successful. The events of late show how accurate my position was. There were protests against the protocols in both Armenia and in the diaspora; there were people who supported the protocols and those who didn’t in both locations. In the end, neither Armenia nor the diaspora is a monolithic block. The protests that occurred in the diaspora attracted more attention because they occurred in centers of developed nations before the eyes of the Western media. For example, no one seemed to take notice of a protest that drew around 60,000 people in Yerevan. There are two other reasons that the protests in the diaspora seemed more active. The first reason is that the Dashnaks in the diaspora are better organized and have a wider base than in Armenia. Secondly, these protests gave voice to an anxiety that is felt even in those groups that support the protocols.

There’s been no polling of the public, or if there has, I’m not aware of it, but I can say that most of the individuals in the American Diaspora have not formed a front against the protocols. However, I need to add that even among those who support it there is a deep sense of suspicion and anxiety. The ones who are protesting are giving voice to this anxiety and for this reason the supporters of the protocols have treated the protests with understanding rather than opposition.

I can categorize the objections in the U.S. on three foundations: a) the compromise on Karabagh, b) the recognition of the boundaries between Turkey and Armenia, and c) the historian’s commission. The third point is the one that draws in the most people to the protests in the U.S. The Turkish media ignored this but when speaking to the diaspora, the Armenian prime minister made a promise regarding the historian’s commission. He gave written and verbal statements saying that there would be no commission dedicated to the question of “whether or not 1915 was a genocide,” and that in fact none of the commissions would be “historian’s commissions.”

In summary, without recognizing that the most important source of protest is the search for justice, we cannot comprehend the developments. To equate the diaspora with the MHP because of protests that fundamentally “seek justice” is truly disrespectful and insolent. My humble opinion on the subject to our media and intellectuals is, before picking up a pen and writing, take a look at English-language publications like the Armenian Weekly, the Armenian Reporter, and the Armenian Mirror-Spectator.

VEK: The Turkish media has suggested that Armenia retreated from its position of demanding recognition of the genocide. How do you evaluate the ability to debate the genocide and the recognition of borders?

TA: First of all, I would like to say something about the issue regarding the demand for territory. It was 1999 and I had been invited to Los Angeles. It was my first trip to America. The documentary about Vahakn Dadrian’s and my life, “Wall of Silence,” was going to be shown and I was supposed to give a talk afterwards. The people who invited me there were of a political bent that was very far from the Dashnaks. In my talk I had wanted to make a statement to the effect that “We need to debate what happened in 1915 not as an issue of land or borders but as one related to human rights. We need to accept the fact that the present borders are going to stay right where they are and that the subject of territory is basically closed.” One of the organizers, my dear friend Hratch whom I had just met said, “Taner, don’t say those things. I understand, you’re right and no one has their head in the clouds, but if you say these things it will just destroy these peoples’ hopes and dreams. The issue of land isn’t just one of simple nationalism. For an Armenian it is also an emotional connection with the past. If you say, it’s done, it’s all over, you are going to send these people into a tailspin.” Of course, I said what I wanted to say in the end because I wanted them to hear what I really believed.

What I want to explain with this memory is that the demand for land is something inextricably linked with Armenian identity. I want to make the point that having been forced out of their homeland, it has a very emotional aspect to it. Of course, for political and practical reasons one can insist on the meaninglessness and the pointlessness of making this kind of demand, but I think it’s important to keep in mind this other aspect to it.

Otherwise I want to restate my position that it is a mistake to make a distinction between the Armenian Diaspora and Armenia proper on the subject of the recognition of the genocide and facing history. Neither Armenia nor the diaspora will ever give up on the idea of recognition of the genocide. The only difference may be in how this recognition should evolve. This difference will be felt in both communities along a line that will divide both down the middle. It is possible to describe each side. What both sides have in common is a demand that what happened in 1915 be defined as a crime and that there should be an apology for it. One side, however, would be ready to accept that a “crime against humanity” was committed while the other would insist that it should be labeled “genocide” and nothing less. One other difference may come about on the question of restitution. One side may find an honest and serious apology acceptable while the other will probably propose various views on different measures of restitution.

By my own guess, I believe that the Armenian government will make the diaspora a partner in this process. The diaspora is truly a product of the genocide and for this reason it is going to want to take sides in the debate surrounding the genocide and the measures that need to be taken to heal from its effects. This is what occurred in German-Israeli relations during the 1950’s. Israel created a mechanism whereby the Jewish Diaspora was included. Something similar could be tried by Armenia.

VEK: What is your most recent research focused on?

TA: My goal as a scholar is to create a body of common knowledge. My central argument is that what we are missing in Turkish-Armenian relations is a body of common knowledge. Most of the materials related to this topic are dispersed and only available in different languages, and therefore often inaccessible. This makes it difficult for scholars, interested audiences, and the general public to read these sources and to share access to the same materials. We have to create a common basis on which we can agree to talk. For a long period of time, I have been collecting and publishing original Ottoman sources to make my contribution to the field.

There is a basic controversy in our field. The Turkish government argues that one should rely exclusively on Ottoman sources because only they can be trusted. The government insists that only Ottoman sources may be utilized to analyze the events surrounding 1915. The Turkish government also argues that American, German, Austrian, and British sources are biased and representative of an agenda that aimed to cover up their own policies. Their sources are perceived as an attempt to blame Turkey and the Turks for what took place. On the other side, Armenians and many other international scholars argue that Ottoman documents cannot be trusted and therefore must be ignored. There are enormous archives available and the Turkish government continues to publish document after document from its archives to substantiate its own claims and to support its own thesis, but there is little conversation between the two sides.

My position represents a fresh look within the field because I argue very simply that there is no contradiction between various archival materials. We simply find that the same story is told from a variety of perspectives. I produced a Turkish book two years ago in which I published more than 600 Ottoman documents to show that the genocidal intent of the Union and Progress Party can be proven based on Ottoman materials. Now I am collecting newspapers from the period of 1918-22. I have a full collection of Ottoman newspapers from that time period. What is important about that particular period is that there was no censorship at that time. These papers published absolutely everything, including issues we are excessively debating today. These newspapers offer extensive reports related to killings, deportations, and the subsequent trials in Istanbul. These trials were recorded by the Turkish press, which also published documents and memoires, and columnists and editors wrote in detail about how the country would need to face its recent crimes. This information must be made accessible to Turkish readers. I am editing these newspapers to select certain articles that have to be widely read.

There are two specific projects in front of me now. I hope to publish materials related to two important Istanbul trials in 1919. They are named after the provinces where the massacres and deportations took place and where individuals were held responsible for what took place. One is called the Yozgat trial, the other is the Trabzon trial. In total I’m analyzing some 40 court proceedings that were covered by the press. The role of Turkish eyewitnesses is particularly interesting because the press mentioned their significance. Based on Turkish eyewitness accounts that accused Turkish officials of having committed crimes, the panel of judges made their decisions. This is invaluable information, which shows that a lot of Turks in 1918 and 1919 spoke out openly against the massacres that were endorsed by the Union and Progress Party.